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ABSTRACT 
 
In this article, I examine a new concept of “Twin Memory’ 
which has emerged in memory classification research of 
conscious and unconscious memory representations. It is to 
analyse the presence of twin memory among the various 
memory systems, and also to provide a platform for the twin 
memory “anatomy” in the field of cognitive science.  
 
As we live in the moment of “our actual conscious experience” 
(Rose 1993: 9) which we also call present, and it is undoubtedly 
receding instantly to become a past. This past is a trajectory of 
time and in this arrow of time which irreversibly moves forward 
memory is built and shaped from the trajectory of past 
experiences. The past and the present have bond like double helix 
structure of a DNA, and memory is retrospectively mutated in a 
space between them, each time we recall them. In the process of 
“memory mutation” memories are transformed, permeated with 
new meanings and edited by causality. The act of remembering 
begins with the encoding of a perceptual or conceptual event 
within a given cognitive environment that represents all aspects 
of the state of the system that are relevant to the event and its 
encoding. It ends with the creation of a cognitive state referred to 
as ecphoric information. It is constructed on the basis of both the 
(usually receded) engram and the retrieval cue (cf. Buschke 
1987). The retrieval of our past experiences become represented 
within “the mix of molecules, of ions, proteins and lipids that 
make up the ten billion nerve cells of our brains” (Rose 1993: 5), 
and we collectively call them memory systems. A crucial 
component of cognition is memory. Memory is made up of a 
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number of different and inter-related systems that are defined, 
among other features, by how we access them or the type of 
information encoded (Squire 1992; Miyashita 2004). Some 
memories are easy to access while others require “search 
strategy” to retrieve them. For example, an essential password of 
a bank locker has been lost; without this password I won’t be 
able to get the locked treasure in it. In such a situation the hidden 
or lost memory require twin memory to recall them. We may also 
call it copycat of the original memory. A simple nudging to the 
memory by the twin memory may dig out a chunk or various 
distributed proportions of other memories. There are two sources 
involved in this procedure of nudging to the memory. The first 
one is “external event,” it may comprise anything from tangible 
evidence like dress, place, book, shoe, body, colour, skin, watch, 
face, etc. to intangible objects like smell, taste, sound, laugh, 
touch, feelings, emotions, pain, happiness, a word, name, a 
particular incidence, evidence, environment, etc. The second 
source is “internal event” which is a chunk of memory nudging 
other memories to life; it is like a box within a box and the 
process of getting another box in them continues nonstop. It is 
something like one is opening and passing through various doors 
in a huge building to reach the roof top. It is like a butterfly 
flying from one flower to another, never standing still. And also 
when the “external event” meets with the “internal event” point 
of comparison, reflection and also repulsion succinctly arrive 
among them; which mainly gives birth to the process of “twin 
memory.” These all processes of nudging the hidden or lost 
memory takes place in “connective patterns” within the memory 
systems. Here, however, one may argue straightforwardly that in 
the issue of twin memory seeing connective patterns in 
unconnected data to relate to the memory pattern is simple a case 
of pareidolia. It is “an optical illusion when people see familiar 
shapes or objects in textures or patterns, coupled with over active 
imaginations” (Austin 2016). It is a form of apophenia, which is 
when people see patterns or connections in unconnected data. For 
example, a man seeing his own childhood in another child, and 
also seeing the statue of Buddha on Mars have a similar 
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phenomenon of pareidolia. Indeed, if there is no connectivity 
between both the subjects/objects but still connective patterns 
may evolve in between them; as it takes place mostly with our 
memory which reflect on to other memory or object and starts 
searching for some connectivity with them. For example, a past 
and a present, as we know that both of them are distinct from 
each other but still they are interrelated. In our mental time travel 
from the present to the pastsome of these past memories are 
either lost or forgotten. But do we then really forget them at all? 
For this, Steven Rose in The Making of Memory writes that 
“memory is encoded in some way within our brains, so that, if 
only we could find the key to accessing them, every detail of our 
past would become as transparent to us as is the present moment 
of our consciousness” (Rose 1993: 5). What is this key? 
Unconsciously/consciously, we are adding some units and 
changing others to access all of the memory lanes. It can be a 
challenge to retrieve a position of memory that is hidden or lost 
but the rewards are worth it. We have been creating units for 
years that access the various memory lanes. Similarly, interfacing 
the hidden or lost memory with similar objects, incidences, 
situations and factors may also retrieve them. This phenomenon 
occurs with two methods: “Unconscious Interfacing” and 
“Conscious Interfacing” of the mind. As our brain is borrowing 
innumerable information from our surroundings, environment, 
impressions of people, objects, actions and also from our own 
behaviour, etc., but these borrowing are mostly taking place 
without notifying us. The received information then stored into 
specific region of the brain cells can be later awakened by a 
cluster of memory; forasmuch a cluster of negative memory is 
likely to awake another negative memory rather a positive 
memory. These kinds of information are stored basically with 
semantic memory. If the memory isn’t consciously retrieved and 
fetched back into consciousness then it becomes “Unconscious 
Interfacing.” When the memory is consciously retrieved and 
fetched back into consciousness then it becomes “Conscious 
Interfacing.” Even if a large part of the memory is lost and only 
little fragments of it left away, then also it may rebuild itself with 
remaining clusters and may generate a new copy of the lost 
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memory. Into this process conscious stimuli influence 
unconscious behaviour in classic priming procedures. Can it be 
said that unconscious primes influence conscious behaviour? Not 
really; according to one study at least, it only influences other 
unconscious information. Specifically, Balota (1983) found 
semantic priming from both primes that were in awareness and 
primes that were outside of awareness (i.e., imperceptible). The 
two kinds of primes differed, however, when it came to 
influencing direct memory tests (Czigler 2010: 21) of recalling 
the hidden or lost memory in the models specifically identified as 
STM (short-term memory or “working memory”) or LTM (long-
term memory or “reference memory”). One reason to demarcate 
conscious versus unconscious processing in the model is that the 
information in conscious awareness is assumed to gain access to 
much deeper and extensive perceptual and conceptual analysis 
using long-term memory information than information that is 
outside of conscious awareness. Therefore, directing conscious 
awareness is an important skill for harnessing information 
processing to succeed at a task (Czigler 2010: 6). Now in order to 
find out the hidden or lost memory (e.g., the password of the 
bank treasure) I try to recall it by identifying relevant information 
related to it. Likewise I collect similar things, objects, words, 
numbers, etc., any related thing to the password. The filtering of 
the information continued to take place until the password was 
recovered. Of course, either encoding of information into an 
unconscious store or encoding of information into a conscious 
store could be influenced by the ability to filter out or exclude 
irrelevant items. This type of mechanism also agrees well with 
the notion that individuals with better span are those who are 
better able to exclude or inhibit irrelevant information (Lustig 
2007).  
Distinctively, the mind selects in between the interplaying of 
“conscious interfacing” or the “unconscious interfacing” which 
one is more effective at the moment of searching the lost 
information. Therefore, the first point involves the contrasting 
between the conscious and the unconscious efforts led by the 
mind, heretofore, the second point abstracts which one either the 
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“conscious interfacing” or the “unconscious interfacing” is more 
dominant upon each other for finding the lost information (e.g., 
the password of the bank treasure). Both the conscious and the 
unconscious interplay according to their regular practises of 
movement on the neural circuits; as in a certain task (e.g., of 
recalling memory) some people are more conscious than others, 
meanwhile, some people may be using their unconscious 
interfaces much more than conscious interfaces to transcend the 
experiences limited to one’s imagination. Precisely because the 
mind has to choose one path either conscious or the unconscious 
at a regular interval before processing an information, in fact, 
both of them reel together into a cyclic precision, henceforth, like 
a wheel they are creating a movement to recollect, to fetch, even 
to delete (to make a new space for memory), to disconnect 
(between memories), to store, to relate, or to reveal the sought 
information. The information after being extracted from different 
departments of the brain and then processed by the synaptic 
modules is unconsciously fetched to awareness. Moreover, the 
interplay between conscious and unconscious elements of 
working memory makes for some fascinating phenomena 
(Simons & Rensink 2005) and among them is the formation of 
various meeting (convergent) points during their interaction, 
collision and fusion. This mechanism in which the different 
“internal events” reflecting on to the different “external events” 
to wake the hidden or lost memory from the subconscious mind 
in order to fetch it back to conscious mind may decode it. 
In particular, I request the reader of this article to perform a 
small experiment along with me to test the theory of “twin 
memory.” In this experiment you have to take a stick in your 
hand. Open your palm and then beat the stick noisily on your 
palm. What does it remind to you at once? Certainly, it reminded 
me of my school days when the teacher used to beat me in the 
same way for being poor in my studies. While feeling pain on my 
palm it immediately nudged to the memories of the school days, 
that of similar pain. If you were lucky enough to skip the 
teacher’s stick then the procuring memory would be much 
different at this stage. Here we must notice that we didn’t make 
any effort for any memory of the school days or to any memory 
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related to pain on the palm as it arrived quickly only after the 
stick was beaten on the palm. Before beating of the stick my 
mind wasn’t thinking anything about the school or about the 
teacher but it was thinking something else. You must have also 
observed here the recent incident of pain has similarity with the 
past incident of pain. The recent incident of pain pushes the 
similar “suppressed memory” of pain to life, henceforth it has 
found its “twin brother.” Here the stick acts as an “external 
event” to prompt this task of memory retrieval. In a similar 
fashion, a happy event occurring in one’s life may also recall and 
submerge him into a series of past happy events. Similarly, a 
negative memory may instigate several other negative memories 
at once and it may also lead to a “nervous breakdown.”  
In the next piece of evidence first it raises a question in the 
context of twin memory: Does memory have a twin brother? Yes. 
For example, recently, I taught at Patna University in the 
department of English. There I was stopped by an empty 
classroom when I was passing by its doors. The doors recalled 
me that once I was appraised by an English teacher in the room 
for saving a flying sparrow (in this incidence the sparrow seemed 
looking for an exit in the closed classroom. I had immediately 
switched off the ceiling fans in the classroom when the sparrow 
was flying near to them. I feared that it might be hit by the 
moving blades of the ceiling fans. Then I opened a window and 
the sparrow found its exit). When I entered the classroom I 
couldn’t tell what exactly the feelings were, but sometimes now, 
as a new visitor to the past, I try to catch back into the bygone 
moments. The smells of the same wooden desks in the classroom 
brought with it memories that I never recalled previously. I 
looked up at the ceiling fans and also my eyes raced for the 
sparrow among them. This signifies that of our existence in day 
to day life depending upon external/internal events for the 
reminder of the past and the present events. People remember 
and forget numerous things every day. So you may put a 
reminder in your cell phone, or put your hand watch on an alarm, 
or tag a small note at your working desk, or tell someone to 
remind you of your specific task, or do anything to make you 
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recalled and reminded so not to miss the essential task. If I asked 
you to tell me the last thing you forgot, perhaps you would say 
that you forgot to do some task that you had intended to do, like 
take a vitamin, run an errand, or give someone a message. In 
keeping with earlier terminology (e.g. Harris 1984), we will call 
this type of memory (remembering to perform actions) 
prospective memory. Prospective memory can be contrasted with 
remembering actions previously performed or, more generally, 
previously encountered episodes, called retrospective memory. 
One readily apparent difference between retrospective memory 
(as it is typically studied in the laboratory) and prospective 
memory is that there is usually an agent prompting remembering 
in retrospective memory tasks. In typical retrospective memory 
tasks studied in the laboratory, experimenters put subjects in a 
retrieval mode (Tulving 1983), which initiates remembering and 
sensitizes subjects to the meaning of retrieved memories. By 
contrast, in prospective memory tasks, internal or external events 
must trigger remembering that it is time to perform an intended 
action, in the absence of being in a retrieval mode. In this sense, 
prospective memory is more similar to the involuntary 
remembering (Ebbinghaus 1964; Richardson-Klavehn, Gardiner 
& Java 1994) that occurs when thoughts spontaneously come to 
mind – a phenomenon that occurs frequently in everyday life. 
Moreover, retrieving the information from explicit episodic 
memory (retrospective, remembering or conscious recollection) 
“is contingent on the establishment of a special mental set, 
dubbed episodic ‘retrieval mode’” (Tulving 2005: 5).  
     According to Moscovitch (1994) explicit episodic 
(retrospective) memory is mediated by several subsystems 
corresponding to unique neuropsychological components (p. 34). 
The position that explicit episodic memory performance is only 
based on conceptual information overlooked that memory tasks 
are often constructed in a way that subjects can rely (completely) 
on conceptual information (p. 54). One primary subsystem is the 
medial-temporal/hippocampal module, which mediates the 
encoding, storage, and retrieval of associative information. A 
central feature of this subsystem is that it processes information 
specifically for the purposes of associative retrieval, with 
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retrieval proceeding in an automatic, nonstrategic fashion. In 
particular, this module accepts consciously-attended information 
(cues for memory retrieval) and automatically produces 
interactions between the cues and memory traces previously 
associated with the cues. If the cue is sufficient (i.e., if the 
attended information produces enough interaction [ecphory] with 
a memory trace), then the module delivers that memory trace to 
consciousness rapidly, obligatorily, and with few cognitive 
resources. Further, the module operates reflexively, such that if 
the attended information (a cue) does not interact sufficiently 
with a particular memory trace, then that memory trace is not 
retrieved (unless another subsystem strategically generates 
additional cues for input to the hippocampal module). 
Moscovitch assumed that such strategic processes are mediated 
by a prefrontal subsystem and that both the automatic, 
hippocampal module and the strategic, prefrontal subsystem are 
involved in explicit episodic retrospective memory (McDaniel, 
Robinson-Riegler & Einstein 1998). The working assumption is 
that prospective memory retrieval is supported by the automatic 
associative memory module. This assumption provides an 
account of how prospective remembering occurs despite the fact 
that there is no external agent to prompt memory retrieval. The 
idea is that when a prospective memory target event is 
encountered, if the target event is consciously processed, then it 
is input to the associative memory module. If there is sufficient 
interaction (ecphory) between the cue (the target event) and the 
memory trace that specifies the intended action, then that 
intended action is automatically delivered to consciousness (i.e., 
the idea to perform the intended action is retrieved). If there is 
not sufficient ecphory, then the intended action is not delivered to 
consciousness and prospective remembering does not occur 
(Moscovitch 1994: 34). 
Here, however, we must not forget that a human brain is an 
automatic machine which doesn’t require any electrical switch of 
consciousness to access memories all the time. Even a dead brain 
or an impaired brain keeps functioning for a given time 
according to their neural circuits and networks. As information 
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flows through the neural circuits and networks of the brain, the 
activity of the neurons act according to the strengthening and 
weakening of the synapses (synaptic plasticity) and this 
mechanism is called “long term potential” or “LTP.” Each 
millisecond different types of new information are added to our 
brain and we might not notice them. It appears to be common 
intuition that storage of new information in the brain should 
correspond to some “additive process” at the substrate level, 
anything from synaptic strengthening to formation of new 
synapses. Seminal theories like Hebb’s (1949) favoured this 
view. Findings, such as long-term potentiation (LTP) (Bliss & 
Lomo 1973; Gustafsson & Wigstrom 1988), synaptic learning in 
Aplysia (Abrams & Kandel 1988), and cortical synapse 
formation after environmental enrichment (Greenough & Bailey 
1988) have strengthened the point. Consequently, computer 
models of associative networks have adopted differential 
strengthening of connections as a basic mechanism (Hopfield 
1982; Linsker 1988; Palm 1981; Sejnowski & Rosenberg 1987). 
The strengthening mechanism according to memory retrieval 
mode continues to enhance and enlarge the memory patterns in 
various ways. These patterns also give birth to new memory 
systems and sub-systems. Although it is still based on 
hypothetical constructs, the view that human memory is 
composed of five interrelated memory systems (Nyberg & 
Tulving 1996; Tulving 1983, 1985, 1993; Tulving & Schacter 
1990). Initially these took the form of various dichotomies, such 
as those between short-term and long-term memory (e.g., 
Shallice & Warrington 1970; Warrington & Shallice 1969), 
episodic and semantic memory (Kinsbourne & Wood 1975; 
Tulving 1972; Warrington 1975), and procedural and declarative 
memory (Cohen 1984; Cohen & Squire 1980; Squire & Cohen 
1984). Now, however, more comprehensive structures have been 
proposed (e.g., Johnson 1990; Squire 1987; Tulving 1983, 1987; 
Warrington 1979; Weiskrantz 1987, 1990) as “twin memory.” 
While placing it among the five interrelated memory systems 
may be potentially controversial, but instead of this situation I 
believe that the procedural placement for it would be with 
unconscious and conscious memory representations.  
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     Whereas both the conscious and unconscious mechanisms 
contribute to the general priming effect, the degree of 
involvement of each is difficult to determine. However, it is clear 
that the underlying operations of the priming effect are not 
uniformly conscious in nature (Gilchrist, Cowan & Nelson 2008: 
20). Unconscious and conscious processes operate in a variety of 
cognitive tasks but the findings from these two areas allow for a 
clear dissociation between conscious and unconscious processes. 
Using a broad definition, conscious information can be 
considered any stimulus, either externally – or internally –
generated, which we are aware of at any given time – thus, these 
items are “in mind.” In contrast, unconscious stimuli are those 
items which are currently not in awareness, and have no 
reportability. Although one is typically unable to classify 
unconscious information, previous studies find that these still 
exert effects on behaviour, particularly on indirect or implicit 
tests of memory. Both conscious and unconscious mechanisms 
may be involved in myriad cognitive tasks, operating in a similar 
manner as automatic familiarity and controlled recollection 
(Jacoby 1991: 513-541). Cowan (1988, 1995, 1999, 2005) 
summarized diverse evidence relevant to the conscious versus 
unconscious status of information in activated memory versus the 
focus of attention. What is critical is that sensory features from 
multiple stimuli can become activated in memory at the same 
time, without evidence that they enter awareness. However, 
deeper processing seems to require awareness, making the 
system more like that of Broadbent (1958), he proposed a very 
simple model of memory that took into account the latest 
evidence; in that model, a large amount of sensory information 
was encoded in a temporary buffer (like what is now called 
working memory). However, only a small proportion of it ever 
made its way into the limited-capacity part of memory, where it 
was analyzed and categorized with the benefit of the vast amount 
of information saved in long-term memory, and eventually added 
to that long-term bank of knowledge. Atkinson & Shiffrin (1968) 
then developed that sort of memory framework into a more 
explicit model in which mathematical simulations were made of 
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the transfer of information from one store to another through 
encoding, retrieval, and rehearsal processes. Baddeley & Hitch 
(1974) soon found that this simple treatment of working memory 
would not do. In addition to information temporarily held in a 
form likely to be related to consciousness (James 1890), they 
argued in favour of other storage faculties that operated 
automatically, outside of voluntary control. Cowan (1988) was 
noncommittal about whether the automatically activated 
information could include semantic information. Unlike 
Broadbent I still assume that it may but, like Broadbent, I do not 
believe that automatic activation of semantic features captures 
attention. The evidence comes from separate auditory and visual 
studies (Gilchrist, Cowan & Nelson 2008: 12). For example, 
importantly, when individuals familiar with major-minor tonal 
music listen to such music, they transfer the sensual pitch 
information (that is, information about the pitches of the tones of 
melodies or chords) into a cognitive representation of the 
location of tones and chords within the tonal hierarchy of a key, 
as well as within the (major-minor) tonal key space. In other 
words, when processing harmonic information, listeners relate 
new harmonic information to the previous harmonic context in 
terms of harmonic distance, and in terms of its functional-
harmonic information. The representations of such regularities 
are stored in long-term memory, and by its very nature it needs 
listening experience to extract the statistical properties of the 
probabilities for the transitions of chord functions (Tillmann, 
Bharucha & Bigand 2000). These statistical properties are 
implicitly learned in the sense that they are extracted without 
conscious effort by the individuals, and stored in a long-term 
memory format.  
Suppose, for example,a friend gifts you a wooden ink pen 
which immediately recalls you of another wooden ink pen placed 
at your grandfather’s desk had a particular smell. About your 
grandfather’s pen you never recalled it after having seen it once 
as a toddler. But its smell and picture stored in your memory is 
once again brought to life by the gifted pen. This is a long term 
memory which can also become a short term memory, and after 
this you may also forget it or start tracing for it. As Abbot (2002) 
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suggests that long-term memory format “is that more permanent 
store in which information can reside in a dormant state – out of 
mind and unused – until you fetch it back into consciousness” 
(2002: 1). Therefore, the automatic consciousness is associated 
with the ‘synergistic ecphory model’ of recall and recognition of 
past events and things. But why do smells have this power to 
unlock forgotten memories? Before noticing these criteria of 
smells have we noticed that a similar object (e.g., the wooden ink 
pen) can trace back to the lost or hidden memory. Anything 
which has some similarity with the lost or hidden memory can 
evoke its submerged particles of cues once again to life. The 
smell reflects and reconnects to the lost past and this thing 
happens without consciously putting your mind to trace for it. 
And if there is no connectivity between the smell and the past 
then there will be no tracing to the past. Not necessarily. 
In the next phase of the experiment I request again to the 
reader of this article to perform a little psychological experiment 
on his/her own mind. For this you have to use conscious effort to 
access all of those memories long stored. It is vastly stored for 
years and to visit them at once isn’t possible so you choose 
specific regions of the memory those are nearly forgotten (e.g., 
your childhood memory). The conscious exploration into the 
memory lanes may become more interesting as you did so. You 
can call this a mental time travel from the present to the past. The 
neural circuits of your brain are like busy neural highways where 
thoughts processes continue to move at their speed, henceforth, 
to visit a specific memory region you have to make a route 
among these busy tracks. Per hour thousands of thoughts come 
and go, and only those thoughts which have been given more 
attention douse into a pool of consciousness to get life; it is as if 
consciousness is a screen on which projector brain projects the 
film of memory. Majority of thoughts aren’t invited by your 
conscious mind; they come and fade upon their own. At this 
calculation you are amazed to discover that most of them are 
useless, irrelevant and unimportant thoughts and all of them 
passed through your mind faster than the speed of light travel. 
Come and go of the thoughts continue like a squirrel jumping 
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from one tree to another, never standing still. It also takes time to 
switch from one memory to another as the mind is always busy 
since its inception. Consciousness isn’t capable to hold its grip on 
various thoughts originating from its womb. Also consciousness 
isn’t able to project many thoughts and feelings but it stays like a 
silent observer to the traffic of thoughts. Even though some of 
the thoughts may be disturbing and exhausting that initially you 
have to suppress them before they can grow. The suppressing of 
such thoughts also takes considerable concentration, time and 
causations when they are suppressed by another thought or 
action. You may also notice that the amount of time taken for the 
episodic memory retrieval explains further the strong or weak 
connections of the wiring in a human brain. Your way of 
thinking may differ from others but we are same humans with 
same speed of thoughts travelling on our neural highways. Only 
the thing that matters is the kind of thoughts travelling, and 
thereafter, we are bringing them out into what type of actions. 
Furthermore, you may face another problem as to retrieve all of 
the childhood memories aren’t possible at all. “One might expect 
that the older the memory, the harder it would be for a person 
with a memory deficit to locate it, but the reverse turns out to be 
the case; old memories are preserved whilst recent ones are more 
easily lost” (Rose 1993: 78). In your case it isn’t a different story 
as some of your past memories failed to be recalled. Some of 
them may appear into fragments of colours and distorted pictures 
with unclear sounds and voices those you may visualise and hear 
but cannot understand at all, while the rest of others are still 
waiting to be recaptured. You aren’t able to reach back into your 
recent or old past. You can only see that you are a small boy 
playing in a school with some children but many acts on daily 
basis at the school can’t be recalled as if they were never 
recorded into memory by your brain. Then you find a photo 
album of your childhood photographs starting from a baby to 
boyhood to adulthood as well. They are really helpful to 
reconnect to the lost or hidden memories in many ways. A single 
photograph acts as a linkage to several other memories and you 
become capable to visit some of them. This album is an example 
of “twin memory.” Thus we can say that twin memory is acting 
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like a bridge between the conscious and unconscious interfaces. 
In between there are some pictures you aren’t able to recall. 
Afterwards, any relevant or irrelevant result to the sought 
memory is unobvious.  
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